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AbstrAct
Discussions on the relation between populism and 
democracy have become growingly frequent in the lit-
erature. Some authors consider that there is a virtuous 
relation between both phenomena, while others define 
the relation between populism and democracy as am-
biguous, and a third stream views populism as a threat 
for democracy. In this article I review three books that 
are paradigmatic examples of the mentioned currents, 
and I support the following position: populism is com-
patible with democracy, and it reinforces its participatory 
dimension, but it presents certain tensions with political 
pluralism. In addition, the analysis performed in the pre-
sent article suggests that the relation between populism 
and democracy takes specific forms in each case, and 
systematic comparative research on populist and non-
populist actors is needed to better identify the distinctive 
features of populism.
Keywords
Democracy; Pluralism; Political Participation; Populism; 
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resumen
Los debates sobre la relación entre populismo y democra-
cia son cada vez más frecuentes en la literatura. Ciertos 
autores consideran que existe una relación virtuosa entre 
ambos fenómenos, mientras otros definen la relación en-
tre populismo y democracia como ambigua, y una terce-
ra corriente ve el populismo como una amenaza para la 
democracia. En este artículo analizo tres libros que son 
ejemplos paradigmáticos de las mencionadas corrientes 
y sostengo la siguiente postura: el populismo es compa-
tible con la democracia y refuerza su dimensión partici-
pativa, pero el populismo presenta ciertas tensiones con 
el pluralismo político. Además, el análisis realizado en el 
presente artículo sugiere que la relación entre populismo 
y democracia adopta formas específicas en cada caso, 
y se necesita investigación comparada sistemática sobre 
actores populistas y no populistas para identificar mejor 
las características distintivas del populismo.
PAlAbrAs clAve 
Democracia; Derechos; Participación Política; Pluralismo; 
Populismo.
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The discussion on the relation between populism 
and democracy has become one of the most vivid 
contemporary debates on populism, due to the recent 
rise of parties and political leaders broadly consid-
ered as populist in Europe and the United States. The 
scholarly interest in the relation between populism and 
democracy is also explained by the fact that both have 
expanded globally in parallel during the last 150 years. 
As Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017, p. 4) have 
pointed out: “As an ideology that exalts the general will 
of the people, populism profits from the growing global 
hegemony of the democratic ideal as well as from both 
the possibilities of electoral democracy and the frustra-
tions with liberal democracy”.
The most frequent positions on the relation between 
populism and democracy can be synthesized into three 
streams: authors who consider that there is a virtuous 
relation between populism and democracy, those who 
defend that these phenomena have an ambiguous re-
lation, and scholars who see populism as a threat to de-
mocracy. The present article reviews the three positions, 
and argues that populism is compatible with democ-
racy, and it reinforces its participatory dimension, but 
populism presents certain tensions with political plural-
ism. The discussion is addressed through three books 
that are paradigmatic of the three streams described 
above: Chantal Mouffe’s The Democratic Paradox 
(2003); Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser’s 
Populism, a Very Short Introduction (2017); and Jan-
Werner Müller’s What is Populism? (2017). 
The Democratic Paradox is one of the key works of 
Chantal Mouffe’s theory of agonistic democracy, which 
takes part of the post Marxist reflections developed by 
Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau in their Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy (1985). Ever since, the positions 
of both authors have evolved towards the defense 
of progressive populism, as explained in Laclau’s On 
Populist Reason (2005) and Mouffe’s On the Political 
(2005) and Agonistics: Thinking the World Politically 
(2013). In The Democratic Paradox, Mouffe criticizes 
the aversion of Western liberal democracies to conflict 
and advocates instead “agonist pluralism”, a concep-
tion of democracy in which conflict plays a core role 
in the context of a pluralist polity. This key book lays 
the foundations for Mouffe’s advocacy of populism in 
later works and her support for left-wing populist par-
ties such as Podemos and France Insoumise.
In Populism, a Very Short Introduction (2017), Cas 
Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, respectively 
associate professors at the University of Notre Dame 
(USA) and the Diego Portales University (Chili), con-
densate their years of work on populism. Mudde is 
the author of Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe 
(2007) and Rovira Kaltwasser co-edited The Oxford 
Handbook of Populism (2017), among other works. 
Populism, a Very Short Introduction addresses topics 
such as the definition of populism, the variety of em-
pirical manifestations of populism around the world, 
the mobilization strategies of populist actors, populist 
leadership, and the relation between populism and 
democracy. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser perform a 
balanced analysis of the relation between populism 
and democracy, arguing that populism can foster po-
litical participation, although it threatens liberal insti-
tutions, pluralism and the rule of law.
The last volume included in this review is What is 
Populism?, written by the German political scientist 
and Princeton professor Jan-Werner Müller, who is 
also the author of Contesting Democracy: Political 
Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe (2011). Müller’s 
What is Populism? is scheduled to be translated into 
twenty languages, which suggests that it has had a 
major impact on academia. Müller’s book is a para-
mount example of the academic stream that consid-
ers populism as a threat to democracy, because it 
allegedly rejects pluralism and several constitutive 
elements of liberal democracies — such as an inde-
pendent judicial system and institutions specialized 
in protecting human rights.
This article proceeds in three parts. First, I propose 
a definition of ‘democracy’ and ‘populism’. Secondly, 
I address the relation between populism and the lib-
eral dimension of liberal democracy (political plural-
ism, checks and balances, institutions that protect 
fundamental rights, and the rule of law). Lastly, I look 
at the relation between populism and the democratic 
dimension of liberal democracy (popular sovereignty 
and majority rule).
1. defining democrAcy And PoPulism
The first difficulty of the debate on the relation 
between democracy and populism is the contested 
character of both terms. Thus, it is necessary to pro-
pose minimal definitions of populism and democracy 
that allow us to address the different positions of the 
authors to be reviewed here.
Regarding democracy, it is key to distinguish be-
tween ‘democracy’ and ‘liberal democracy’. According 
to Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, “democracy with-
out adjectives” can be defined as “the combination 
of popular sovereignty and majority rule”, while the 
term ‘liberal democracy’ also implies the existence of 
institutions to protect fundamental rights, defending 
individuals against an eventual “tyranny of the ma-
jority” (pp. 80-81), and respect of political pluralism. 
The concept of ‘liberal democracy’ also includes the 
rule of law, which is defined by the Oxford English 
Dictionary as the “authority and influence of law in 
society, especially when viewed as a constraint on 
individual and institutional behavior”. In a similar vein, 
Mouffe defines contemporary Western democracies 
as the result of the articulation between two political 
traditions: “the liberal tradition, constituted by the rule 
of law, the defense of human rights and the respect 
or individual freedom; [and] the democratic tradition, 
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whose main ideas are equality, identity between gov-
ernors and the governed, and popular sovereignty” 
(p. 20). In the present article I will focus on liberal 
democracy, which is defined as a political regime that 
combines popular sovereignty and majority rule, po-
litical pluralism, check and balances, institutions to 
protect fundamental rights, and the rule of law.
The conceptual disputes on populism are even 
more intense. Different authors have defined pop-
ulism as a strategy (De la Torre and Peruzzotti 
2008; Weyland 2001), an ideology (Mudde 2004; 
Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013), or an inter-
vention (Panizza 2014). However, most of the defi-
nitions have a minimum element in common that 
allows insightful debates on populism: the estab-
lishing of a discursive division between the people 
(depicted as ‘pure’) and the ‘corrupt’ elite (Mudde 
and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013). Insofar as populism 
often appears in combination with other ideological 
traditions (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013: 150) 
(there are both left-wing and right-wing populists), 
each populist actor proposes a different definition of 
the people and the elite.
2. PoPulism And the liberAl 
dimension of liberAl democrAcy
Liberal democracy combines majority rule and 
popular sovereignty with some limits to popular will, 
namely institutions to protect human rights and the 
rule of law, which also guarantee respect for politi-
cal pluralism. In this section, I look at how populism 
relates to the liberal dimension of liberal democracy.
Populism and Liberal Institutions
Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser sustain that popu-
lists reject liberal institutions because they “constrain 
‘the will of the (pure) people”’ (p. 81). In a similar vein, 
Müller states that “populism can never be combined 
with liberalism, if one means by the latter something 
like a respect for pluralism and an understanding of 
democracy as necessarily involving checks and bal-
ances (and, in general, constraints on the popular 
will)” (p. 9). By contrast, Mouffe does not identify any 
incompatibility between populism and the mentioned 
liberal institutions.
The first focus of Mudde, Rovira Kaltwasser and 
Müller is the allegedly undemocratic inner organiza-
tion of populist parties. Müller considers that “Populist 
parties are almost always internally monolithic, with 
the rank-and-file clearly subordinated to a single 
leader” (p. 37). His analysis is based in examples 
such as Netherlands’ Geert Wilders’ PVV, which is 
officially composed of two members: Wilders him-
self and a foundation whose only member is him. 
According to Müller, populists keep a hostile stance 
towards parties because “Parties formed govern-
ments and legitimate oppositions; their very exist-
ence as legitimate “parts” (as opposed to “the whole”) 
had an antipopulist meaning” (p. 79). For their part, 
Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser consider that the polit-
ical organizations created by populist leaders are not 
genuine political parties but “personalistic electoral 
vehicles”, because “in many cases the organization 
is largely a facade, as there are few members, com-
mittees, or internal structures” (p. 44). Populist politi-
cal organizations such as Wilder’s PVV wholly match 
this definition, but a previous systematic comparative 
analysis of the inner organization of populist parties 
is needed before proposing a general diagnosis. One 
of the few existing works on this issue performs a 
comparative analysis of European left-wing populist 
parties Podemos and France Insoumise, reaching 
the conclusion that no specific form of inner organi-
zation can be attributed to populism (Castaño 2018).
Secondly, Müller analyses in detail the supposedly 
hostile attitude of populists in power towards state 
bureaucracies and the judiciary, which are respon-
sible for guaranteeing the neutrality of the adminis-
tration, the rule of law and protecting fundamental 
rights. In Müller’s words “populist governance ex-
hibits three features: attempts to hijack the state ap-
paratus, corruption and “mass clientelism” […], and 
efforts systematically to suppress civil society” (p. 
4). Some of the examples provided are the attacks 
on the independence of the judiciary by Polish Law 
and Justice Party and Hungarian Fidesz (president 
Viktor Orban’s party), and the legal reforms pro-
moted by Fidesz to allow the ruling party to place 
its militants in bureaucratic positions that should be 
nonpartisan. Besides, Müller denounces that me-
dia authorities have been “captured” by Orban’s 
far-right populist government (p. 45), while Repoll 
(2010, pp. 63–64) accused Argentina’s former pop-
ulist president Cristina Fernández of attacking the 
press. Mouffe does not explicitly address this issue 
in The Democratic Paradox, but she has expressed 
her support to populist parties in countries such as 
Venezuela and Argentina (Mouffe 2015).
It is undeniable that many populist leaders have 
shown hostile attitudes regarding liberal institutions, 
but there is not enough empirical ground to sustain 
that populists restrain human rights or jeopardize the 
rule of law more often than non-populist politicians. 
The 2017/18 Annual Report of the NGO Amnesty 
International (2018), which provides a comprehensive 
account of the situation of human rights around the 
world, does not allow for the drawing of a net distinc-
tion between populist and non-populist governments 
regarding violations of fundamental rights. The report 
denounces the limitations of protest-related rights in 
countries led by president that can be qualified as 
populists, such as Venezuela, as well as the assault of 
fundamental freedoms justified by so-called the ‘war 
on terror’ in countries governed by non-populist lead-
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ers: “Europe has continued to slip towards a near-per-
manent state of securitization. France, for example, 
ended its state of emergency in November, but only 
after adopting a new anti-terror law, which embedded 
in ordinary law many of the provisions of the emer-
gency regime” (Amnesty International 2018, pp. 12-
14). In a similar vein, the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights has expressed concern that (both pop-
ulist and non-populist) European governments have 
“created barriers to migrants’ full enjoyment of their 
human rights” (Office of the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights 2017, p. 7). Comparative empirical 
analysis of the behaviours of populist and non-populist 
actors regarding liberal institutions and human rights 
are needed before affirming that populists generally 
promote “illiberal democracy”, as Mudde and Rovira 
Kaltwasser sustain (p. 82).
Populist Constitutionalism
The promotion of new constitutions or deep con-
stitutional reforms is considered by Mudde, Rovira 
Kaltwasser and Müller as a key aspect of populist gov-
ernance. According to Müller, populists in power seek 
constitutional change with the aim of retaining pow-
er (p. 63). He devotes considerable attention to the 
constitutional processes promoted by left-wing Hugo 
Chávez in Venezuela, Rafael Correa in Ecuador and 
Evo Morales in Bolivia. According to Müller, “the new 
constitutions [...] seriously constrained the capacity of 
the opposition to compete in a free and fair manner 
against the populist governments” (p. 32). Regarding 
European far-right populists, Müller denounces that 
governing parties with large majorities can “enact a 
new constitution justified as an effort to appropriate the 
state for the “real Hungarians” or “real Poles” (p. 57). 
Müller mixes here the xenophobic or racist character 
of some populist leaders with the peculiarities of pop-
ulism itself. By contrast, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 
argue that other populists have not used constitutions 
to promote exclusionary ethnic-based conceptions of 
the people — on the contrary, the constitutions pro-
moted by left-wing populist leaders in Venezuela, 
Ecuador and Bolivia have reinforced the protection 
of indigenous rights. The constitutionalism practiced 
by European far-right populists and Latin American 
left-wing ones share one major feature, according to 
Müller: “They used constitutions to set up conditions 
for the perpetuation of populist powers” (p. 66).
Two major objections can be levelled against 
Müller’s analysis. First of all, he sees with a critical eye 
the very fact of a party promoting constitutional reforms 
or the convocation of a constituent assembly. However, 
the periodic reform of constitutions or the elaboration of 
new ones are normal features of democratic constitu-
tionalism, as pointed out by authors such as Pisarello 
(2014), who has analysed how constitutional ruptures 
are often periods of democratic and social progress. 
Secondly, Müller’s criticism of the restriction of the 
opposition’s rights by the constitutions promoted by 
Chávez, Correa and Morales is at the very least ex-
aggerated. These constitutions contain the same kind 
of liberal check and balances than European consti-
tutions (namely an independent judiciary and consti-
tutional courts). In addition, they include mechanisms 
that are absent from most European constitutions, 
such as the possibility of revoke elected officials, term 
limits for representatives, and strong electoral courts. 
Nevertheless, it is true that at least some of the men-
tioned constitutions reinforced the power of the ex-
ecutive, as De la Torre (2016) has explained. For in-
stance, the Ecuadorian constitution gives the president 
the power to veto any law for a period of a year. Even 
though this kind of provision exists in other constitu-
tions (such as the United States one), the length of the 
period is longer in the case of Ecuador.
In conclusion, some European far-right populists 
have promoted illiberal constitutional reforms (for 
instance, in 2013 Fidesz modified the Hungarian 
constitution to allow the president’s intervention in 
the judiciary) and Latin American left-wing populists 
have reinforced the power of the executive. However, 
the latter constitutions contain power-limiting mecha-
nisms that are absent from most European consti-
tutions, such as the possibility of revoking elected 
officials, term limits for representatives and strong 
electoral courts. Therefore, it is far-fetched to affirm 
that populist constitutions are generally disrespectful 
of liberal mechanisms, as suggested by Müller.
Is Populism Anti-Pluralist?
Respect towards political pluralism is widely con-
ceived as one of the basic features of liberal democ-
racy. Thus, discussions on the compatibility between 
populism and political pluralism are key to under-
standing the broader relation between populism and 
liberal democracy. Mouffe, on the one hand, and 
Mudde, Rovira Kaltwasser and Müller, on the other, 
hold quite different positions on this issue.
The importance of political pluralism is explicitly 
acknowledged by Mouffe, who considers that “plural-
ism must be taken seriously”, which should lead us 
to “abandon the dream of a rational consensus” (p. 
111) allegedly proposed by authors such as Jürgen 
Habermas (1995). Instead, Mouffe advocates “ago-
nistic pluralism”, a conception of politics in which it 
is possible to build an ‘us-them’ relation where “the 
‘them’ is not perceived as an enemy that must be de-
stroyed but as an ‘adversary’, someone whose ideas 
we tackle but whose right to defend those ideas we 
don’t question” (p. 114). This proposal leads Mouffe 
to explicitly defend an ‘agonistic’ form of left-wing 
populism in later works (e.g. Errejón and Mouffe 
2015). Mouffe’s ‘agonistic pluralism’ is a particular 
kind of ‘soft’ rivalry between the people and the elite 
that intends to make populism compatible with plural-
ism — and therefore, with liberal democracy.
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By contrast, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser consid-
er that all populist actors oppose pluralism, as “pop-
ulism holds that nothing should constrain “the will of 
the (pure) people” (p. 81). In other words, “populism 
is essentially democratic, but at odds with liberal de-
mocracy” (p. 81). Müller holds a similar stance: he 
considers that populism is always a threat to politi-
cal pluralism, because populist actors “claim that a 
part of the people is the people — and that only the 
populist authentically identifies and represents this 
real or true people” (pp. 22-23). As a consequence, 
populists “refuse to recognize any opposition as le-
gitimate” when they are in power (p. 3). The three au-
thors also coincide in highlighting that populism “mor-
alizes” political conflicts, presenting their opponents 
(the elite) as corrupt, and this moralization of politics 
makes it very difficult to reach agreements (Mudde 
and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017: 83).
The idea that populism is incompatible with plural-
ism due to the moralization of politics performed by 
populist actors has sound empirical support. When 
populist parties have negotiated coalitions with non-
populist formations that they had previously depicted 
as part of the elite, either populists have softened their 
tone on them (as Podemos did regarding the Spanish 
Socialist Party after the 2015 regional and local elec-
tions), or reaching agreement has proved impossible 
— in Italy, the virulent rhetoric of the populist Five Star 
Movement on the Democratic Party (PD) contributed 
to hampering the negotiations to form a joint govern-
ment after the 2018 legislative election, and the Five 
Star Movement ended up finding an arrangement with 
far-right Northern League. In conclusion, the concern 
about the anti-pluralist trend of populism raised by 
Mudde, Rovira Kaltwasser and Müller seems con-
firmed by practice, even though Mouffe’s concept of 
‘agonism’ challenges exaggerated assertions that pre-
sent populism as an almost totalitarian force seeking 
to eliminate any opponents, as implied in Müller’s idea 
that populists “refuse to recognize any opposition as 
legitimate” (Müller 2017, p. 3).
3. PoPulism And the democrAtic 
dimension of liberAl democrAcy
Discussions on the compatibility of populism with 
liberal democracy tend to focus on the liberal dimen-
sions of contemporary democracies, but it is also 
necessary to look at the relation between populism 
and popular sovereignty, which is the very foundation 
of democracy. Several authors have underlined the 
capacity of populists to politicize unattended social 
concerns, foster the political participation of previ-
ously marginalized groups, and increase the use of 
forms of direct democracy. This reflection is particu-
larly important if we take into account the crisis of le-
gitimacy in Western democracies, a concern shared 
by all the authors included in this review.
Liberal Democracy in Crisis
Mouffe considers that Western democracies suffer 
a “democratic deficit” expressed at least through two 
trends: “A growing number of people feel that tradition-
al parties no longer take their interests into account, 
and far-right parties are experiencing major progress 
in many European countries” (p. 95). The crisis of 
Western democracies has become more serious in 
the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis, when the 
bureaucracy of the European Union took control of the 
bulk of the economic policies of the member states. 
Müller also takes a critic stance on the increasing pow-
er of technocracy in the European Union (pp. 96-97) 
and considers that Mouffe’s criticism on the delegitimi-
zation of conflict in contemporary democracies “needs 
to be answered” (p. 60). For their part, Mudde and 
Rovira Kaltwasser sustain that certain social groups 
do not feel represented by the “establishment” in con-
temporary Western democracies, for mainstream par-
ties fail to meet their demands (pp. 18-19). 
The concern about the crisis of liberal democracies 
has led the mentioned authors to look at the potential 
capacity of populism to “democratize democracy”, as 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos famously put it (2004). 
Mouffe considers that ‘agonistic pluralism’ would 
enrich democracy in the following way: “Insofar as 
it prevents us against the illusion that a completely 
achieved democracy can be feasible, it forces us to 
keep democratic controversy alive. It allows a mar-
gin for discrepancy” (p. 117). For their part, Mudde 
and Rovira Kaltwasser argue that “populism can be 
seen as a democratizing force, since it defends the 
principle of popular sovereignty with the aim of em-
powering groups that do not feel represented by the 
political establishment” (p. 18). By contrast, Müller 
considers that populism cannot have any positive ef-
fect on democracy, as it will be further explained.
Politicizing Unattended Social Concerns
First of all, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser point out 
that populism can be a democratizing force by pro-
moting the “repoliticization of certain topics, which ei-
ther intentionally or unintentionally are not (adequate-
ly) addressed by the establishment” (p. 19). That is, 
populist parties bring to the political discussion legiti-
mate social concerns that had been excluded from 
the public debate by traditional political forces. 
For her part, Mouffe warns about the spread of “ex-
treme forms of individualism that threaten the social tis-
sue” (p. 109) in contemporary democracies. According 
to her, “the growing of various religious, moral and eth-
nic fundamentalisms is the direct consequence of the 
democratic deficit that characterizes most liberal demo-
cratic societies” (pp. 109-110). In a later book, Mouffe 
defends that left-wing populism can politicize in a pro-
gressive way social unrest that could otherwise be po-
liticized by the far right (Errejón and Mouffe 2015).
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plebiscites. Qvortrup (2000) reviewed 128 referenda 
celebrated in several countries throughout the sec-
ond half of the 20th century, reaching a twofold con-
clusion: most governments only convoke plebiscites 
when they are convinced that they will win, but they 
hardly ever obtain the desired result. 
Indeed, it seems that populist leaders tend to call 
for referenda more often than non-populist ones. 
Besides, contemporary populism provides sound ex-
amples of Qvortrup’s conclusions: both Chávez and 
Morales convoked referenda to eliminate the term 
limits set by constitutions, and both lost, while Orban’s 
referendum on EU migrant quotas was invalid be-
cause less than 40 percent of the electorate took part 
in it. In conclusion, Mudde, Rovira Kaltwasser and 
Müller are right in identifying the frequent recourse 
to direct democracy instruments as a distinctive fea-
ture of populism. It must be added that (both populist 
and non-populist) governments tend to convoke ref-
erenda when they believe that they will win, but they 
hardly ever succeed in controlling the result. Thus, as 
Qvortrup (2000, p. 824) sustains, referenda can be 
an effective check on governments and parliaments.
conclusions
Relations between populism and democracy pro-
voke intense debates in academia. The interest raised 
by this issue is not surprising, taking into account the 
central place that democracy holds in contemporary 
politics and the rise that populism has experienced 
since the beginning of the 21st century, first in Latin 
America and later in Europe and the United States.
The present article has reviewed the three more fre-
quent scholarly positions on the relation between pop-
ulism and democracy. Some authors defend that they 
maintain a virtuous relation, others see an ambiguous 
relation between both phenomena, while other scholars 
consider that populism is a threat to democracy. One 
representative book of each stream of thought has been 
reviewed: Chantal Mouffe’s The Democratic Paradox 
(2003); Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser’s 
Populism, a Very Short Introduction (2017); and Jan-
Werner Müller’s What is Populism? (2017). The joint 
analysis of the three works suggests that populism is 
compatible with democracy, and it reinforces its par-
ticipatory dimension, but populism presents certain ten-
sions with political pluralism. This means that a virtuous 
relation between populism and liberal democracy can 
take place in some cases, but it is not guaranteed. In 
the following paragraph, some tentative conclusions 
based on the analysis of the three books are drawn.
In the first part of the paper, the relation between 
populism and the liberal dimension of liberal democ-
racy was analysed, reaching a twofold conclusion. 
On the one hand, there is neither enough empirical 
data to sustain that the inner organisation of populist 
parties is generally less democratic than that of other 
The capacity of populist actors to politicize previously 
unattended concerns seems to be confirmed in prac-
tice — the attention paid by traditional parties to issues 
such as inequality and poverty has increased due to the 
apparition of populist parties that have politicized those 
concerns, both in Latin America and Europe.
Including the Excluded
In the previous section, I have addressed the ca-
pacity of populism to politicize hitherto unattended 
social demands. The second positive effect of pop-
ulism on democracy, identified by Mudde and Rovira 
Kaltwasser, is its capacity to “mobilize excluded sec-
tors of society, improving their integration into the po-
litical system” (p. 83). There are populist radical right 
parties that seek to exclude certain groups from polit-
ical participation, particularly ethnic minority groups, 
but Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser have rightly point-
ed out that it is their xenophobic orientation that ex-
plains this exclusion, not their populist character (p. 
83). This is a key distinction, which challenges the 
tendency of certain authors (Müller is one of them) to 
blame populism for the behaviours of all kinds of pop-
ulist actors that they consider incompatible with liber-
al democracy. As Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser have 
explained, populist constructions can be progressive 
or conservative, which has led them to establish a 
distinction between inclusionary and exclusionary 
populism (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013).
The capacity of populist actors to integrate previ-
ously excluded groups in political life has also been 
highlighted by De la Torre (2000). In some cases, 
this integration has amounted to the political mobi-
lization of social sectors that had been previously 
de facto excluded from politics, such as the work-
ing class in Juan Perón’s Argentina, and indigenous 
peoples in Evo Morales’ Bolivia. In other cases, the 
political integration promoted by populism has taken 
a legal form, such as the approval of female suffrage 
in Argentina in 1947.
Direct Democracy
Lastly, the literature on populism sustains that pop-
ulist actors promote the direct involvement of citizens 
in politics by frequently convoking referenda and 
other forms of direct democracy (De la Torre 2013; 
Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017; Müller 2017), 
because populists see representative democracy as 
“an aristocratic form of power, in which citizens are 
treated as passive entities” (p. 17). Müller considers 
that populist leaders only use referenda as a tool to 
confirm the leader’s power, an affirmation that must 
be put into relation with broader discussions in the lit-
erature on referenda. Research on referenda has of-
ten addressed two questions: whether governments 
only convoke referenda when they are certain that 
they will win, and whether they succeed in controlling 
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parties, nor to sustain that populist leaders are more 
hostile to liberal institutions than non-populist lead-
ers, nor that they promote less liberal constitutions 
than other political actors. On the other hand, there 
is a tension between populism and the respect of 
political pluralism, which is a constitutive feature of 
liberal democracy. In the second part of the article I 
have looked at how populism influences the demo-
cratic dimension of liberal democracies, reaching the 
conclusion that populist actors can reinforce these 
political regimes in three ways: politicizing social 
concerns previously unattended by mainstream par-
ties, including social groups that were previously not 
effectively integrated in political life, and increasing 
the recourse to direct democracy mechanisms such 
as referenda and recall votes.
Despite the interest of the reviewed books, they 
do not facilitate the establishment of a general rela-
tion between populism and democracy. Müller gen-
eralizes particular features of European populist far-
right parties as distinctive characteristics of populism, 
which prevents him from reaching convincing con-
clusions on populism in general. Mudde and Rovira 
Kaltwasser include more cases of left-wing populists 
in their analysis, but they do not adopt the systematic 
comparative approach that would be needed to reach 
firm conclusions on the relation between populism 
and the various features of liberal democracy. For 
her part, Mouffe carries out a rather abstract reflec-
tion that does not allow to draw any such conclusion 
either. To sum up, the main conclusion of the present 
article is that a general relation between populism and 
democracy cannot be established on the grounds of 
existing research. Systematic comparative analysis 
of the behaviour of populist and non-populist politi-
cal actors will be needed in order to reach conclu-
sive empirical-based findings on the relation between 
populism and democracy.
references
Mouffe, C. 2003. La paradoja democrática. Barcelona: Gedisa 
(Mouffe, C. 2000. The Democratic Paradox. London/
New York: Verso).
Mudde, C. and C. Rovira Kaltwasser. 2017. Populism, a Very 
Short Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press.
Müller, J.-W. 2017. What is Populism? London: Penguin Books.
Other References
Amnesty International, 2018. Amnesty International Report 
2017/18. The State of the World’s Human Rights. 
London: Amnesty International Ltd.
Castaño, P. 2018. Towards a Definition of ‘Left-Wing 
Populism’: a Comparison Between Podemos and 
France Insoumise”, General Conference of the 
European Council for Political Research, August 22-
25, Hamburg, Germany.
Errejón, I. and C. Mouffe. 2015. Construir pueblo: hegem-
onía y radicalización de la democracia. Barcelona: 
Icaria Editorial
Habermas, J. 1995 “Reconciliation through the Public Use 
of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls’s Political 
Liberalism.” The Journal of Philosophy 82 (3): 109-
131. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil199592335
Laclau, E. 2005. On Populist Reason. London: Verso.
Mouffe, C. 2005. On the Political. London/New York: Routledge.
Mouffe, C. 2013. Agonistics: Thinking the World Politically. 
London: Verso.
Mouffe, C. 2015. “Hay una necesaria dimensión populista en 
democracia.” El País, April 19.
Mudde, C. 2004. “The Populist Zeitgeist.” Government and 
Opposition 39(4): 541-563. https://doi.org/10.1111/
j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x
Mudde, C. 2007. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.
org/10.1017/CBO9780511492037
Mudde, C. and C. Rovira Kaltwasser. 2013. “Exclusionary 
vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary 
Europe and Latin America.” Government and 
Opposition 48 (2): 147–174. https://doi.org/10.1017/
gov.2012.11
Müller, J.-W. 2011. Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas 
in Twentieth-Century Europe. New Haven: Yale 
University Press.
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. 2017. 
In Search of Dignity: Report on the Human Rights of 
Migrants at Europe’s Borders. Geneva: United Nations.
Panizza, F. 2014. “Intervenciones, identidades e instituciones 
populistas.” Colombia Internacional 82: 291–295. htt-
ps://doi.org/10.7440/colombiaint82.2014.11
Pisarello, G. 2014. Procesos constituyentes: caminos para la 
ruptura democrática. Madrid: Trotta.
Qvortrup, M. 2000. “Are Referendums Controlled and Pro-
hegemonic?” Political Studies 48: 821-826. https://doi.
org/10.1111/1467-9248.00285
Repoll, J. 2010. “Política y medios de comunicación en Argentina: 
Kirchner, Clarín y la Ley.” Andamios 7(14): 35–67.
Rovira Kaltwasser, C., P. A. Taggart, P. O. Espejo and P. 
Ostiguy (eds.). 2017. The Oxford Handbook of 
Populism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Santos, B. de S. (coord.). 2004. Democratizar la democracia: 
los caminos de la democracia participativa. México, D. 
F.: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
Torre, C. de la and E. Peruzzotti (eds.). 2008. El retorno 
del pueblo: populismo y nuevas democracias en 
América Latina. Quito: FLACSO/Ministerio de 
Cultura del Ecuador.
Torre, C. de la. 2000. Populist Seduction in Latin America: 
the Ecuadorian Experience. Athens: Ohio 
University Press. 
Torre, C. de la. 2013. “In the Name of the People: 
Democratization, Popular Organizations, and Populism 
in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador.” ERLACS 95: 27–
48. https://doi.org/10.18352/erlacs.9229
Torre, C. de la. 2016. “Populism and the politics of the extraor-
dinary in Latin America.” Journal of Political Ideologies 
21(2): 121-139. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2016
.1150137
Weyland, K. 2001. “Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism 
in the Study of Latin American Politics.” Comparative 
Politics 34(1): 1-22. https://doi.org/10.2307/422412
RIS  [online] 2018, 76 (4), e113. REVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE SOCIOLOGÍA. ISSN-L: 0034-9712 
https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2018.76.4.18.089
8 . PABLO CASTAÑO
PABLO CASTAÑO es doctorando en Ciencia Política, Políticas Públicas y Relaciones Internacionales y becario PIF en la 
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (Instituto de Gobierno y Políticas Públicas-IGOP). Es graduado en Derecho y Ciencias 
Políticas por la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, ha completado un Máster en Derecho Constitucional en el Centro de 
Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales de Madrid (CEPC) y un MPhil (máster de investigación) en Sociología en Goldsmiths 
College (University of London) financiado por la beca de la Fundación La Caixa. Al autor le gustaría expresar su agradec-
imiento a Ana Laura Cannilla Morozovich por sus comentarios al borrador de este artículo.
